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BRIGNOLl tI. SEABOABD TRANSPOB'l'ATION

Co. [29 C.2d

[Sac. No. 5805. In Bank. Mar. 14, 1947.]

CHARLES BRIGNOLI et al., Plaintiffs ana Appellants,
v. SEABOARD TRANSPORTATION CO. (a Corporation) et al., Defendants and Appellants.
[1] New Trial-Errors in LaW-llIBtructioDB.-A new trial may
be granted on the ground of "errors in law occurring at the
trial" when an instruction has been given which includes an
incorrect or incomplete statement of the law applicable to a
material issue, and the error was not cured by the charge
as a whole or otherwise rendered harmless. (Code eiv. Proc.,
§ 657, subd. 7.)
(2] Id.-Errors in Law-llIBtructioDB.-Where it appears that an
erroneous instruction confused or misled the jury, a new trial
is justified.
[8] Carriers-Property-llIBtructioDB.-In an action involving the
liability of a motor carrier for loss of freight, an instruction
concerning a contract carrier was incomplete and therefore
erroneous where it stated merely that such a carrier was not
bound to carry for every person and could refuse to do so
without incurring any liabiilty, and where the characteristics
of the relationship of a common carrier and that of a contract
carrier were of vital importance.
[4] Id.-Property-IDBtructioDB.-In an action involving the liability of a motor carrier for loss of freight, a statement in an
instruction that a common carrier is one who undertakes
generally and for all persons indifferently, to carry goods and
if he refuses, without some just ground, to carry goods for
everyone he would be liable in damages, was too broad and,
moreover, was inconsistent with another instruction that a
eommon carrier is one who holds his transportation services I
out to a substantial portion of the publie for some variety
or varieties of freight.
I
[6] New Trial-llIBlUIiciency of Evidence-Discretion-Review.'
-A trial court in considering a motion for new trial on the
ground of insufficiency of the evidence is not bound by a con":
dict in the evidence, and does not abuse its discretion in grant-·
ing the motion where there is any evidence which would support a judgment in favor of the moving party.
[6] Id.-Order-Effect.-When an order granting a new trial is
made on a ground other than that of insufficiency of the evi-

[1] See 20 Cal.Jm. 139; 39 Am.Jm. 127.
McK. Dig. References: [1J New Trial, § 124; [2) New Trial,
§125; [3,4] Carriers, §40; [5] New Trial, §99j [6] New Trial,
191; [7] Carriers, § 35; [8] Carriera, §S8; [9] Carriers, 140.2.
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dence, the court impliedly bolds that there is .ufticient evi~
dence to support the verdict, but 8uch a ruling does not include an implied determination that there is insuftleient evidence to 8Upport a contrary verdict.
[7a, 7b] Oarriers-Propertl"-Questions of Law and Fact. - In an
action involving the liability of a motor carrier for loss of
freight, the capaoity in which the carrier was acting at the
time of the loss, whether as a common carrier or as a contract
or private carrier, as well as the negligence of the carrier and
its driver, were questions of fact primarily for the jury under
the evidence.
[8] Id.-Property-Evidence.-The liability of a common carrier
for damage to property in transit under a contract to transport
is practically absolute, and the burden is on the carrier, if it
would escape liability, to show that the loss resulted from one
of the causes stated in Civ. Code, § 2194, as an exception to
the general rule.
[9] Id.-Property-New TriaL-In an action involving the liability of a motor carrier for loss of freight, it was not an abuse
of discretion to grant defendants a new trial for failure to
give an instruction fully defining the relationship of a contract
highway carrier, where the charaoteristics of the relationship
of a common carrier and that of a contract or private carrier
were of vital importance and the instructions stating the distinction between the two were 80 inadequate that tbe jurors
were oonfused tbereby.

APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of San
Joaquin County and from an order granting a new trial.
M. G. Woodward, Judge. Appeal from judgment dismissed;
order affirmed.
Action by motor carrier and others on common count for
services rendered, and cross-action against carrier for loss of
freight. Order granting defendants a new trial after judgment on a verdict in plaintiffs' favor, affirmed j appeal from
judgment dismissed.
Bau.erken, Ames & St. Clair, Gumpert & Mazzara, George
B. Hauerken, J. Calvert Snyder and Alden Ames for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Neumiller, DiU. Beardslee & Sheppard and R. L. Beardslee
for Defendants and Appellants.
[8] 8ee 4 OaLJur. 870; 9 Am...Tur. 813.
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EDMONDS, J.-Charles Brignoli and Charles Trombetta, I
doing business
Rampone Brothers, sued Seaboard Transportation Company, a corporation, to recover for trucking
services rendered to it. Seaboard admitted liability to the
amount of approximately $7,100, but by cross-complaint demanded over $14:,000 on account of the loss of goods by fire
while entrusted to Rampone Brothers for carriage. Rampone
Brothers have appealed from an order granting a new trial
after judgment upon a verdict in their favor, and there is also
an appeal from the judgment_ The principal questions for
decision concern the instructions to the jury.
Before the trial, Seaboard was dissolved and Walter
Junge, its principal stockholder, took over its assets, assumed
its liabilities, and continued the business under the same name. i
Counsel then stipulated that any judgment rendered in the.
action shall inure to the benefit of and shall bind Walter A.I
Junge. doing business as Seaboard Transportation Company,'
and that the name Seaboard Transportation Company, when
referred to or mentioned in the pleadings or elsewhere, shall
include Junge, doing business as Seaboard Transportation
Company, as well as the dissolved corporation. The word
"Seaboard" will, therefore, now be used with the meaning
stated in the stipulation.
The complaint alleged a common count for services rendered in the amount of .8,34:8.24: during the preceding
two years. By answer, Seaboard admitted indebtedness of
$7,166.48. The answer included a counterclaim, pleaded in
two counts, which was treated by the parties and the court
as constituting a cross-complaint. In the first count, Seaboard
charged that it had delivered to Rampone Brothers, as a com-.
mon carrier, goods belonging to the United States of Ameriea.1
In the course of transit, and while in their exclusive pos..~es
sion and control, Seaboard alleged, the goods were damaged
or destroyed in the amount of $14:.486.98. The second count
alternatively pleaded that the goods received by Rampone
Brothers in the capacity of a contract carrier were destroyed
or damaged in transit by their negligence.
In al1S\Vering the cross-«)mplaint, Rampone Brothers admitted that they received the goods from the corporation for
carriage. The destruction of, or damage to, the goods was
als«t admitted, but they denied that they were then aeting as
a common carrier. Affirmatively, it was alleged that the goods,
received in the capacit1 of a private or contract carrier, were

as
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destroyed or damaged by fire while in their possession and
under their control but without any fault on their part.
Upon these issues, evidence was presented showing the following facts: Rampone Brothers, engaged in the trucking
business, were duly licensed by the Railroad Commission of
the State of California as a radial highway common carrier
and a highway contract carrier. (See Highway Carriers'
Act, Stats. 1935, p. 878 as amended; Deering's Gen. Laws,
Act 5129a.) Their application to act as a radial highway
common carrier specified the area to be served as that within
a radius of 150 miles from Oakland. They also held a certi1icate of public convenience and necessity issued under the provisions of the Publi<! Utilities Act for the transportation of
fresh fruits, vegetables and canned goods. (See Deering's
Gen. Laws, Act 6386. § 503,4.) Seaboard was licensed as a
radial highway common carrier.
The principal business of Rampone Brothers was the transportation by motor truck, of such freight from the delta region
of the San Joaquin and Sacramento Rivers to Oakland and
San Francisco. Most of this hauling was done under the common carrier franchise. During the winter months, they also
hauled other commodities for various shippers, including Seaboard. to divergent parts of the state. In 1943, some of at
least 56 accounts on Rampone Brothers' books showing charges
for services as a common carrier included entries for carrying
freight other than fresh fruits, vegetables and canned goods
for distances in excess of 150 miles from Oakland. On occasion, they refused to carry particular freight.
ThE> United States Army had a contract with Seaboard to
haw goods from certain points near Stockton. Upon verbal
noti1ication from the Army that it had freight to move, Seaboard would accept delivery of the goods and assume full
common carrier liabiJity. When the corporation did not have
sufficient equipment of its own to handle all of the shipments
offered, Seaboard sublet portions of these movements to Rampone Brothers and other tru<!kmen, paying for such services
an amount less than the charge to the government.
Commencing in 1941, Rampone Brothers carried Army
freight for Seaboard but they had no written or oral agreement with Seaboard except as to rate of pay, and there was
no agreement as to the basis or extent of their liability. The
usual procedure was that Seahoard would ask Rampone
Brothers to send speci1ied equipment to the corporation's dis-

)

)
'186

BRIGNOLI tI. SEABO.~RD TRANSPORTATION

Co. [29 C.2d

patcher at the Army base. The goods were loaded and checked
by Army personnel, and Seaboard issued its bilI of lading to
the Army. The driver received a "dray tag" from the corporation's dispatcher and after obtaining a clearance from
the Stockton office of the corporation, proceeded to the designated destination.
The present controversy concerns Army freight which Seaboard requested Rampone Brothers to haul from Stockton.
The corporation had issued to the Army a bill of lading covering the goods. The driver, employed by Rampone Borthel'S
and driving a diesel tractor, semi-trailer and rear trailer, proceeded to the depot where the crates, boxes, and bundles were
loaded on the truck by Army personnel.
About 175 miles from Stockton, the driver felt the truck
"pulling heavy." Upon examining his equipment he found
that the two right front tires of the rear trailer had blown out.
The blown-out tires were warm but not hot. According to the
driver's testimony, he knew that blown-out tires sometimes become hot and cause fire. There was only one spare for the
rear trailer. After about 30 to 45 minutes, with three fiares
placed near the edge of the pavement, the driver left the
vehicle unattended and hailed a passing motorist. He was
taken to Pixley, a town about a mile and one-half away, where
he telephoned to Rampone Brothers for additional tires. Upon
the driver's return, some 45 minutes later, he found the semitrailer in flames and the front one-fourth of the rear trailer
burning. The evidence does not show with any certainty the
cause of the fire. According to the driver, the wind was then
blowing from the rear trailer toward the semi-trailer. With
the help of the fire and police departments, the rear trailer
and much of its load were saved, but the semi-trailer and the
freight it was carrying were completely destroyed. The Army
claimed $14,486.98 as the amount of its loss and Seaboard
paid that sum in settlement.
In instructing the jury, considerable emphasis was placed
by the trial judge upon the liability of a radial highway common carrier, a highway common carrier, and a highway con:
tract or private carrier, but the only instructions given defining these carriers were as follows: "There are two classes of
common carriers operating upon the highways of this State
in intra-state commerce. The first elass is called a 'highway
common carrier' and the second class is called a 'radial highway eommon carrier.' A 'highway common carrier' is one

. I
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who dedicates and holds out his transportation services generally to the public, or a substantial portion thereof, for eompensation, for the transportation of some certain variety or
varieties of freight, at rates filed with the Railroad Commission of the State of California and who usually or ordinarily
operates between fixed termini or over a regular route. Before
commencing his operations as such, a 'highway common carrier' is required to make a showing before the Railroad Commission sufficient to justify and culminating in the issuance
by the Commisison of a certificate that declares that public
convenience and necessity requires such operation. A 'radial
highway common carrier' is one who dedicates and holds out
his transportation services generally to the public, or a substantial portion thereof, for compensation, for the transportation of some certain variety or varieties of freight, and who
does not usually or ordinarily operate between fixed termini
or over a regular route, and who offers to serve anyone within
the scope of his dedication, which scope must be a clearly
defined area." The court also instructed the jury: "Everyone who offers to the public to carry persons, property or
messages, is a common carrier of whatever he thus offers to
carry. To impress upon one the character of a common carrier, it must be shown that he undertakes generally and for
all persons indifferently to carry goods and deliver them for
hire; and that his public profession of his employment be
such that if he refuses, without some just ground, to carry
goods for everyone, in the course of his employment, and
for a reasonable and customary price, he will be liable to an
action. . . ." As a part of this instruction, proposed by
Rampone Brothers, which was the only one defining a private
or contract carrier, the court stateed: "A private or contract
carrier, on the other hand, is not bound to carry for every
person and can refuse to do so without incurring any liability." In another instruction the jury was told: "If you
find from the evidence that ... at the times here in this ease
involved, the plaintiffs, by virtue of their calling, and as a
regular business, undertook to transport goods from place to
place, offering their services to such as chose to employ them
and pay their charges, then I instruct you that plaintiffs were
a common carrier."
About two hours after the jurors commenced their deliberations, they requested further instruction as to the distinction
between a common carrier, a contract carrier, and a radial
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carrier. The first of the quoted instructions was again read to
the jury, and upon being asked by the court, "Does that
answer your question in reference to that point'''. the foreman replied, "Yes, sir!' To the foreman's question as to the
meaning of "the radial area," the trial judge replied that the
answer would have to be found in the evidence. He then
asked the jurora if they understood the meaning of "private
earrier" and they collectively replied, "Yes." But upon in·
quiring whether the jurara wished to have any other instruc·
tion read, one of them asked, "The contract carrier now."
In response to this request the judge reread the instruction
regarding the diJferenee in liability between a common and
eontract carrier and stated: II A earrier may be a common
carrier as to certain types of merchandise, and be a contract
carrier as to other types of merchandise, and this will depend
upon the conduct of the carrier or the agreement of the earrier
with the shipper, or both. The true test as to whether or not
a carrier is a common earrier or a private earrier is. not what
the company is empowered to do, but what it is aetua1ly engaged in doing." After a further question from one of the
jurora, counae1stipulated that the liability of a radial common
carrier is euetly the same as that of a common carrier.
The instruction requested to be given by Seaboard but reo
fused by the court reads as follows: "A contract or private
carrier is distinguished as one who does not dedicate and hold
out his transportation service generally to the publie or a
substantial portion thereof, but who is employed by a select
and limited group of shippera as a private earrler for an
agreed compensation to the exclusion of all othera by a mutu·
ally binding contract entered into and performed in good
faith for an agreed term, and which contract mutually bind.c;
the carrier to transport and the shipper to supply a specific
category of freight and which contract is de1inite as to the
following: 1. The time involved in the performance of the
contract; 2. The route and/or termini and/or area involved
in the performance of the contract; 3. The kind of commodity
or commodities involved in the contract; 4. The tmmage to bE'
hauled; 5. The compensation to be paid and received."
In accordance with a stipulation of the parties, a directed
verdict was returned in favor of Rampone Brothera for
$8,197.02 as the amount due to them for services rendered.
Upon the cross.complaint, the jury found in favor of Rampone
Brothers, and the onQr controversy now at issue ooncerns the

. I
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question of liability for the goods damaged or destroyed by
the fire.
In a memorandum opinion stating the grounds upon wbich
the motion for a new trial was granted, the trial judge declared: ". . . Failure of the Court, through inadvertence, to
give the defendant's instruction defining a private carrier
eonstituted the error of law which I believe, under the peculiar
circumstances of this ease, confused the jury and serious1y
afFected the outcome of the trial. . . . I consider it quite sif!nifteant that the jury, after retirinig, returned to the court'rOOm and requested that the court point out the 'distinction
between a' common carrier. n COlltr~('t r.nl'Mer I!nd II. radial
earrier.· This indicates that the jurors were confused; and I
am convinced now that the Court did not clarify the matter
by giving them the definitions requested. At first blush it
would appear that the error was rather trivial ; that the jurors,
armed with the correct definition of what constituted a common carrier eould, by a sort of process of elimination, solve
the problem for themselves, since a carrier which is not a
eommon carrier necessarily has to be a private carrier. But
a jury is not required to undertake any such task . . . . It has
been held that when instructions are confusing and questions
by the jurors indicate such confusion and the same is not
cleared up by the Court, a new trial should be granted.•.."
In appealing from the order granting the motion for a new
trial and as cross-respondents in the appeal from the judgment, Rampone Brothers contend that, because recovery by
Seaboard rested upon the theory that they were doing business
as a common carrier, an instruction defining the characteristics of a contract carrier was not relevant. And since Seaboard adopted exclusively the theory that they were a common
carrier, it is now estopped from asserting liability upon an.other basis. Furthermore, it is argued, the verdict of the
jury supports the implied findings that they were a contract
carrier and were not negligent. Also, say Rampone Brothers,
because the motion for a new trial was not granted for in.suftlciency of the evidence, the ruling constitutes an implied
finding by the court that they were not a common carrier. A
further contention is that the evidence would not support a
verdict in favor of the corporation. Moreover, the jurors were
correctly, fully, and clearly instructed on the distinction between a common and a contract carrier. Their inquiries show

790
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that they were not confused in this regard and the instruction
proposed by Seaboard defining n contract carrier was not a
correct statement of the law. Under these circumstances,
Rampone Brothers conclude, the record shows neither error
nor a "miscarriage of justice," and the granting of a new
trial was an abuse of discretion. In any event, it is urged, they
should not be required to retry the cause of action for services
because Seaboard has admitted liability for the amount of the
judgment.
As justifying the order, it is evident from the pleadings,
Seaboard contends, that the ease was tried upon the alternative
theories of liability either as a common carrier or as a contract
carrier; therefore, an instruction defining the characteristics
of a contract carrier was relevant and essential because, to
understand fully the obligations of a common carrier, nccessarilyone must know the definition of a contract carrier, and
vice versa. In granting a motion for a new trial upon a
ground other than insufficiency of the evidence, says Seaboard,
although the ruling, in effect, is that there is sutticient evidence
to support the verdict, it dcas not import that there is insufficicnt evidence to support a contrary verdict. Seaboard also
contends that the instructions stating the distinction between a
common and contract carrier were inadequate, and that, as
was clear from the jurors' inquiries, they were confused and
could easily have been misled. The requested instruction defining a contract carrier, refused by the trial court, was a
correct statement of the law, says Seaboard, and there was
substantial evidence to support a finding that Rampone
Brothers are liable, either as a common carrier or a contract
carrier. In conclusion, Seaboard argues, the granting of the
new trial rested in the wide discretion of the trial court, and
the refusal to instruct fully the jury on the characteristics of
a common and contract carrier by more explicitly defining a
contract carrier resulted in a "miscarriage of justice" requiring a new trial.
[1] A new trial may be granted upon the ground of
"errors in law. occurring at the trial" when an instruction has
been given which includes an incorrect or incomplete statement of the law applicable to a material issue, and the error
was not cured by the charge as a whole or otherwise rendered
harmless. (Code Civ. Proc., § 657, subd. 7; Mazzotta v. Los
Angeles Ry. Oorp., 25 Cal.2d 165 [153 P.2d 338] ; Fennessey v.
:Pacific Gas ~ Elec. 00., 10 Cal.2d 538 [76 P.2d 1041 i Conroll
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P,r., 64 Cal.App.2d 217 (148 P.2d 680] ; see 20 Cal.Jur.
189, 140.) [I] And where it appears that an erroneous instruction confused or misled the jury, a new trial is justifled.
(Brown v. George P'pperdine .Foundation, 23 Cat2d 256,262
[148 P.2d 929].)
.
[8] In the present case the characteristics of the relationship of a common carrier and that of a contract or private
carrier were of vital importance. The pleadings, evidence, instructions, and memorandum of opinion on motion for the new
trial, show that the case was tried upon both theories of liability and there is no basis for an estoppel against Seaboard.
The instruction concerning a contract carrier was incomplete
(see Rempone v. Leonardini, 39 C.R.C. 562 [Dee. No. 28526];
Metter of .Fred Belli, 41 C.R.C. 1 (Dec. No. 80382]) and therefore erroneous.
[41 Furthermore, the statement in the instruction relating
to a private carrier, that a common carrier is one who undertakes generally and for all persons indi1ferently, to carry
goods a-.td it he refuses, without some just grounds, to carry
goods for every one he is liable in damages, is too broad. Also
it is inconsistent with the first instruction to the effect that a
common carrier is one who holds his transportation services
out to a substantial portion of the public for some variety or
varieties of freight. In view of the questions posed by the
jurors during their deliberations, it is evident that they were
endeavoring to obtain a clear understanding in regard to the
characteristics of the relationship of each type of carrier.
[6] The trial court in considering a motion for a new trial
is not bound by a conffict in the evidence, and does not abuse
its discretion in granting the motion where there is any evidence which would support a judgment in favor of the moving
party. (Ballard v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 28 ,cal.2d 857,
858 [170 P.2d 465].) [6] When the order is made upon a
ground other than that of insufficiency of the evidence, the
court impliedly holds that there is su1Iicient evidence to support the verdict, and "on appeal from such order it will be
conclusively presumed that the order was not based upon that
ground." (Code Civ. Proc., § 657; Fennessey v. Pacific GfII
ct·
00., "'pre., p. 544.) But such a ruling does not include an implied determination, as Rampone Brothers contend, that there is insumcient evidence to nppol't a contraq
verdict.
Y.
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['1&] The capacity in which Rampone Brothers was acting
at the time of the fire was a question of fact primarily for
the jury (George v. Railroad Com., 219 Cal. 451, 456 [27 P.2d
375]; People v. Duntley, 217 Cal. 150, 165 [17 P.2d 715J;
Haynes v. MacFarlane, 207 Cal. 529, 532 [279 P. 436]), and
there is evidence in the present record tending to prove a
common carrier relationship. The number and varied types
of accounts in the books of Rampone Brothers for charges as
a common carrier, the lack of definiteness of the agreement
between the parties in certain particulars, and the fact that
they were licensed and operating as a radial highway common
earrier, would support a determination that there was such
a relationship as to the particular shipment in controversy.
[8] The liability of a carrier of that kind for damage to
property in transit under the contract to transport is prac·
tically absolute (Anheuser.Busch, Inc. v. Staruy, 28 Ca1.2d
347,349 [170 P.2d 448]), and the burden is upon the earrier,
if it would escape liability, to show that the loss resulted from
one of the causes stated as an exception to the general rule.
(Civ. Code, § 2194; see 4 Cal.Jur. 870.) [7b] The question of
negligence also was for the jury. (Wright v. Los Angeles Ry.
Corp., 14 Cal.2d 168, 176 [93 P.2d 135].) The failure to
equip the rear trailer with more than one spare tire, and the
driver's conduct in leaving the equipment loaded with val·
uable supplies unattended, would have justified a finding of
negligence.
[9] Whether or not the rights of the moving party were
prejudiced by an error of law occurring at the trial is a
matter which rests 80 completely within the discretion of the
trial judge that an appellate court will not interfere with his
action in granting a motion for a new trial upon that ground
except for a manifest abuse of discretion. (Mazzotta v. Los
Angeles Ry. Corp., supra, p. 169; Mathers v. County of Riverside, 22 Cal.2d 781, 786 [141 P.2d 419] ; Fennessey v. Pacific
Gas ~ Elec. Co., supra, p. 544.) In the present case, the in- ,
structions were carefully considered by the trial judge and
he concluded that the failure to fully define for the jury the
relationship of a contract highway earrier prejudiced Seaboard's rights. The record shows no abuse of discretion in
this regard.
The order granting a new trial is affirmed, and the appeal
from the judgment is dismissed. However, in view of Seaboard's admitted liability for services rendered by Rampone

. <
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Brothel'S, the issues upon the new trial should be limited to
the liability, if any, of Rampone Brothers, for the loss and
damage by fire.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., cone1irred.
CARTER, J.-l concur hi the conclusion reached in the
majority opinion upon the sole ground that the trial court
erred in failing to give Seaboard's proposed instruction No. 13
defining a contract carrier. The definition of a contract
carrier contained in the instruction which the court gave was
incomplete and may have operated to confuse the jury. This
was the view taken by the trial court in ruling on the motion
for a new trial, and it is impossible for us to say that such
was not the case. If the instruction proposed by Seaboard had
been given, the jury would then have had before it a correct
definition of a contract carrier and would have been in a
better position to determine the liability of Rampone Brothers
for the loss sustained by Seaboard.
I do not agree with what is said in the majority opinion
relative to the instructions given by the trial court defining a
common carrier. I see no inconsistency in these instructions
and they
both correct. The iDstruction criticized in the
majority opinion as being too broad is as follows: "Everyone
who offel'S to the public to carry persons, property or messages,
is a common carrier of whatever he thus offel'S to carry. To
impress upon one the character of a common carrier, it must
be shown that he undertakes generally and for all persons
indifferently to carry goods and deliver them for hire; and
that his public profession of his employment be such that if he
refuses, without some just ground, to carry goods for every
one, in the COUl'8e of his employment, and for a I'elISOnable and
customary price, he will be liable to an action. . . ." While
the foregoing instruction defines a common carrier in general
terms, I do not believe it can be said to contain an incorrect
statement relative to the requirements of the law necessary to
create the status of a common carrier or loesponsibility which
one assumes in acquiring such status. It is true that as stated
in another instruction given by the court to the jury: ".A.
'highway common carrier' is one who dedicates and holds out
his transportation services generally to the public, or a subltantial portion thereof, for compensation, for the transporta-
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tion of some certain variety or varieties of freight, at rates
filed with the Railroad Commission of the State of Califronia
and who usually or ordinarily operates between fixed termini
or over a regular route." The definition contained in the instruction last quoted is more limited and specific than that
contained in the portion of the instruction first quoted, but
it is clear that the instruction first quoted deals with common
carriers generally and the instruction last quoted deals specifically with "highway common carriers" which operate upon
the highways in this state. While the court would have been
justified in this case in submitting to the jury a definition of
a "highway common carrier" only, I do not think it can be
said that the court committed prejudicial error in giving a
definition in general terms as to what constitutes a common
carrier.
Furthermore, it was the contention of Seaboard that in the
hauling of the particular load of army supplies involved in
this action Rampone Brothers was not operating under a
certificate of public convenience and necessity as a "highway
common carrier" but was acting as a "radial highway common carrier" and it was the contention of Rampone Brothers
that thcy were acting as a "highway contract carrier." Such
being the contention of the respective parties, there is little
likelihood that the jury could have been confused !:Jy anything said in the instructions relative to common carriers
generally.
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent.
The problem whether a carrier is a common carrier involves
questions of fact and of law. It is for the jury to determine
what the facts are; whether the facts establish that a carrier is
a common carrier is a question of law for the court. If there
is con1licting evidence as to the relationship between the
parties, the court must instruct the jury as to the operative
facts that legally fix the status of common carrier and private
carrier and instruct them that if they find the existence of
certain facUl they must find that the carrier is a common carreir, but if they find the existence of certain other facts they
must find that the carrier is a private carrier. After finding
the facUl, the jury must follow the instructions of the court,
and if there is evidence that reasonably warrants the conclusion reached, their verdict is controlling. If the facts are
undisputed and not reasonably susceptible of con1licting in-
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ferenees, it is the sole responsibility of the court to determine
whether the status of common earrier exists, and it is not only
unnecessary but improper to instruct the jury as to the distinction between a common earrier and a private earrier. The
evidence in the present ease as to the relationship between
Seaboard and Rampone Brothers is without conflict and not
reasonably SllSCeptible of conflicting inferences. It was therefore a question of law for the court whether or not Rampone
Brothers were acting as a common earrier. In my opinion
they were not. Since Rampone Brothers did not perform the
services in question as a common earrier, their liability can
be predicated only upon their negligence or the negligence of
their driver, and the question whether they acted as a common
earrier or private earrier should not have been presented to
the jury. No harm was done, however, by doing so, since the
jvy. as demonstrated by its verdict, did not find that Rampone Brothers acted as a common earrier. The jury was
properly instructed as to the negligence issue, and since it
determined that issue in favor of Rampone Brothel'S, there
was no ground for granting a new mill.
It is settled that a common earrier may contract to render
special services ns a private carrier. (Gornstein v. Priver, 64
Cal.App. 249. 254 [221 P. 396]; Santa Fe, P. ct P. R. Co. v.
Grant Bros. Comt. Co .• 228 U.S. 177, 185 [33 S.Ct. 474, 57
L.Ed. 787]; Baltimore ~ Ohio 8. W. R. Co. v. Voight, 176 U.S.
498 [20 S.Ct. 885, 44 L.Ed. 560] ; Northern P. B. Co; v. Adams,
192 U.S. 440 124 S.Ct. 408, 48 L.Ed. 513]; Long v. Lehigh
Valley R. Co., 130 F. 870 [65 C.C.A.354] ; Bank of Kentucky
v. Adams Express Co., 93 U.S. 174. 186 [23 L.Ed. 872]; New
York O. R. Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. (84 U.S.) 357, 377 [21
L.Ed. 627] ; Wilson v. Atlantic Ooast Line R. Co., 129 F. 774,
aif'd, 133 F. 1022 [66 C.C.A. 486]; Cushing v. White, 101
Wash. 172, 181 [172 P. 229] ; Claypool v. Lightning Delivery
00.,38 Ariz. 262, 269 [299 P. 126]; Bernardi Greater Shows
Inc. v. Boston ct Mai·n,e R. R., 86 N.H. 146, 154 [165 P. 124] ; .
Jackson Arch. Iron Works v. Hurlbut, 158 N.Y. 34, 37 (52
N.E. 665, 70 Am.St.Rep. 432); Kimball v. Rutland etc. R. 00.,
26 Vt. 247, 255 [62 Am.Dec. 567] ; 8tate v. Boyd Transfer ct
Storage 00., 168 Minn. 190, 192 [209 N.W. 872} ; Mengel Co.
v.Inland Waterway. Corp., 34 F.Supp. 685, 692; see 13 C.J.S.
32; 9 Am.Jur. 436; 48 L.R.A.N.S. 990.) In all these eases it
was determined as a matter of law whether or not the engage-

796

BBIGNOLl tI. SEABOARD TRANSPORTATION CO.

[29 C.2d

ment in question was so different from the services offered to
the public that the carrier was not a common carrier. AB the
United States Supreme Court declared in Bank of Kentucky
v. Adams Express 00., 93 U.S. 174, 186 [23 L.Ed. 872] : "We
do not deny that a contract may be made which will put a
common carrier on the same level with a private carrier for
hire, as respects his liability for loss caused by his acts or
omissions of others. . . . But what we have to decide in these
cases is, whether the contract proved has that operation!'
(See KimbalZ v. Rutland etc. R. 00.,26 Vt. 247, 255 [62 Am.
Dee. 5671; Jackson Arch. Iron, Works v. Hurlbut, 158 N.Y.
34,37 [52 N.E. 665, 70 Am.St.Rep. 432].) The rule is stated
in 13 C.J.S. 32, as follows: "The question whether a contract
of carriage changes the relation of the carrier from that of a
common carrier to that of a private carrier is one of law."
The cases decided by this court cited in the majority opinion
do not hold to the contrary. In Haynes v. MacFarlane, 207
Cal. 529 [279 P. 436], a common carrier sought to escape liability as such by desigating himself a private carrier in his
contracts and by reserving "all of the privileges and rights of
a contract carrier. to Since public policy prevents a common
carrier's repudiating his liability as such with respect to transactions in which he is "in substance and reality a common
carrier," this court held that such a contract did not protect
the carrier against claims based on his obligations as a common carrier. "The fact that the defendant in his contract
called himself a 'private carrier' could not make him such in
the light of the undisputed facts to the contrary." (207 Cal.
529, 534.) In that case the question whether the carrier acted
as a common carrier was determined as a question of law by
this court. The statement in the decision: "Whether the
status of a freight auto truck operator is public or private in
character is primarily a question of fact in each case," means
that the legal conclusion whether a carrier has acted in the
capacity of a common carrier depends on what he actually did
rather than on the language of the contract that he made with
the shipper. In People v. DuntZey, 217 Cal. 150 [17 P.2d 715J,
the court was concerned with the question whether a tax imposed upon common carriers was properly imposed upon the
defendant. It was held that the findings of the trial court
as to the transactions undertaken in the conduct of defendant's business were supported by the evidence and that from
&hese findings the legal conclusion could reasonably be drawn
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that defendant was not a common earrier. In George v.
Railroad Com., 219 Cal. 451 t27 P.2d 375], the conclusion of
the commission that petitioners were common earriers was
sustained by the same reasoning.
In the present ease the unconflicting evidence shows that
Rampone Brothers undertook to furnish Seaboard with truck,ing equipment and a driver for the transportation of good"
entrusted to Seaboard by the United States Army whenever
Seaboard lacked snfJicient equipment to transport such goods.
Rampone Brothers reserved the right, however, to refuse compliance with Seaboard's request if they needed the equipment
for their regular business. The driver fumished by Ram·
pone Brothers was concerned with neither the loading nor the
delivery of the goods. He reported to Seaboard's dispatcher
at an army eamp and was not present while the merchandise
was loaded. When the truck and other equipment were loaded.
Seaboard delivered to the driver the original and a copy of a
"dray tag" and requested him to sign another copy &8 a receipt. The dray tag was issued on a form furnished by Seaboard. Under the agreement between Seaboard ane Rampone
Brothers the latter received compensation that was about 20
per cent less than the compensation the army paid Seaboard.
Rampone Brothers' driver was subject to Seaboard's instructions &8 to the handling and transportation of the goods. He
was not even to take part in the loading or delivery of the
goods, although such services formed an important part of
the duties of Rampone Brothers with regard to their other
business. Seaboard determined what part of the goods entrusted to it was to be carried by its own equipment, by that
furnished by Rampone Brothers or by other subhaulers. These
undisputed facts demonstrate that the services that Rampone
Brothers rendered to Seaboard were substantially di«erent
from the services for which they held themselves out to the
public as a common carrier. If the services in question were
those of a common earrier, it would follow that Rampone
Brothers were undel" obligation to furnish their equipment
and drivers to anyone upon the same conditions they were
furnished to Seaboard. It is not the duty of a common carrier, however, to place his equipment and personnel under
the control of another earrier.
An inference that Rampone Brothers acted &8 a common
earrier in rendering the services in question eannot be drawn
.from the mere fact that they were licensed, and upon other
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occasions operated, 88 a radial highway common earrier. It
was shown by the uncontradicted evidence that the special
services rendered Seaboard were entirely di1ferent from the
services rendered the public generally as a common earrier.
To hold that such an inference could be drawn despite the I
uncontradicted evidence as to the special nature of the
services is equivalent to holding that the jury could disregard the rule that a common earrier may contract to render
services as a private earrier. It is also immaterial that as
a common earrier Rampone Brothers sometimes earried commodities other than fruit, vegetables, and eanned goods, for
the determination of their status in this ease depends, not
on the kind of goods earried, but upon the cireumstances
under which the services were rendered.
It is unnecessary to determine whether Rampone Brothers
merely leased their equipment to Seaboard or whether they
acted as a contract earrier. In neither event would they .
be liable as a eommon earrier.
A
The order granting a new trial should be reversed, and
the judgment should be aftlrmed.
I

Plaintiffs and Appellants' petition for a rehearing was
denied April 10, 1947. Oaner, J., and Traynor, J., voted
for a rehearing.
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